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Abstract 
 
This paper re-considers some of the evidence for low and declining social mobility in 
Britain, showing that one study based on a re-analysis of cohort figures appears to 
have had an impact on policy-makers out of all proportion to its scale and rigour. The 
study claimed to show that the income of parents and children were more closely 
related for sons born in 1970 than in 1958, and that therefore social mobility was 
declining. It also claimed to show that the incomes of fathers and sons were more 
closely related in Britain than in countries such as Norway. However, a 
reconsideration of the same results in this paper leads to very different conclusions. 
This example is considered in detail here to illustrate the point that it is not always a 
good thing for research to have influence. The most important and ethical challenge 
facing social research in education is to improve its quality rather than its impact. 
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A re-consideration of rates of ‘social mobility’ in Britain: or why research impact is 
not always a good thing 
 
 
The importance of research impact 
 
Publicly-funded research in areas of public policy, such as education, ought to be both 
high quality and relevant to potential users such as policy-makers or practitioners. 
Since at least the mid-1990s, education research in the UK has been criticised for its 
too general lack of relevance and quality (Gorard et al. 2004), and many initiatives 
have been launched that include better linkage between research and policy/practice 
as their aim (such as the establishment of research centres, evidence portals, 
systematic reviews, and the Teaching and Learning Research Programme). These 
initiatives face a difficult task because, of course, researchers and the research 
community cannot completely control the extent to which their findings are read or 
acted upon. The frustration expressed by Halpern (2005), on encountering the 
selective and uncritical way in which policy-makers treat evidence, will be familiar to 
many researchers and the study discussed in detail in this paper provides another 
example of such difficulties. One lever that is more fully under the control of the 
researcher is the quality of the research and its reporting. An over-riding problem with 
initiatives to improve research impact is that whereas quality research without impact 
still has the potential to be useful, research impact without research quality is worse 
than useless. In this paper, I illustrate this point through consideration of a case study 
of recent research with, apparently, very high impact (at least in the sense of claims of 
influence reported by powerful commentators). 
 
 
A study of intergenerational mobility 
 
In a recent speech while she was Secretary of State for Education and Skills, Kelly 
(2006) claimed that ‘Social mobility in the UK has declined, and remains low by 
international standards’ (p.5). This is a direct and attributed reference to the study 
discussed in detail in this paper. Her successor, Alan Johnson, claimed to put social 
mobility at the heart of his personal agenda 
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(http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/politics/article1578723.ece). As Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Gordon Brown repeated the same claim about social mobility in Britain, 
and suggested that overcoming this issue will be a key to his political endeavours 
(http://society.guardian.co.uk/socialexclusion/story/0,,1256901,00.html). Given that, 
at time of writing, Brown is now Prime Minister of the UK, this issue takes on an 
added importance. These politicians are all basing their shocking claim on, and 
making direct reference to, the findings of a highly influential study conducted in 
England by a team funded by the DCFS and the Sutton Trust (Blanden, Gregg and 
Machin 2005).  
 
The explanation for this decline in social mobility, according to Sir Peter Lampl, 
chairman of the Sutton Trust educational charity which sponsored the research, lies in 
the declining standards of education available to the less well-off. In the past, 
grammar schools offered such people an opportunity for self-improvement. 'The 
comprehensive system,' he says, 'was brought in to try to improve social mobility, but 
the opposite has happened' (http://www.suttontrust.com/press068.asp). The research 
finding has influenced a UNICEF report, is explicitly channelled by the Institute for 
Public Policy Research, the Social Market Foundation and other think tanks, and is 
now accepted as fact by many social and media commentators. As a piece of research 
it could hardly have had more widespread acceptance among the influential and their 
influencers.  
 
The Blanden et al. (2005) study purports to show that intergenerational social 
mobility in Britain is low by international standards, and getting lower over time. 
Thus, despite considerable state expenditure on education and welfare, the children of 
poor families tend to be poor and the children of rich families tend to be rich. In this 
account, Britain is very far from being a meritocracy, even though comparator 
countries such as Norway, Sweden and Canada are reasonably meritocratic. The 
researchers attribute the change over time, and hence the poor international standing 
of Britain, to a variety of factors. Most notably, they suggest that grammar schools 
were promoting social mobility in the 1950s and 1960s, providing an escape route 
from poverty for talented working-class children. Grammar schools have now been 
largely abolished in Britain. The authors also argue that more recently, in the 1980s 
and 1990s, the increase in participation in higher education (HE) has 
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disproportionately benefited children from middle-class families. ‘According to the 
LSE, the extra places made available by the expansion of universities in the Eighties 
and Nineties have largely been filled by students from better-off backgrounds’ 
(http://www.suttontrust.com/press068.asp). 
 
The research appears on the website for the Centre for the Economics of Education 
(CEE), of which one of the authors (Machin) is the Director. CEE was set up in 
March 2000, funded by the taxpayer through the Department for Children, Families 
and Schools (DCFS) in England. It is based at the London School of Economics, the 
Institute for Fiscal Studies, and the London Institute of Education. The website claims 
that ‘All three partners have a proven and distinguished track record in the economics 
of education and training, and a great breadth of knowledge on policy relevant issues 
relating to education, training and the labour market’ (http://cee.lse.ac.uk/). Given the 
substantial funding that the CEE has received from the taxpayer, and charitable 
benefaction, and the widespread acceptance and citation of this particular piece of 
research, it is interesting to consider the research quality. On what basis were these 
two claims, the decrease in mobility over time and the poor international standing of 
Britain, actually made? 
 
 
Doubts about changes over time 
 
Both of these hugely important claims were made on the basis of evidence from birth 
cohort studies. The National Child Development Study was set up in 1958 
(NCDS1958) with 16,460 neonates and their families, who have been followed up 
every few years since then for structured interview data about the life, development 
and influences of each child who is, at time of writing, nearly 50 years of age. 
Similarly, the Birth Cohort Study was set up in 1970 (BCS1970) with 16,695 
neonates. The children of these families are now about 36 years of age. One of the 
inevitable problems with an ambitious cohort study of this kind is that not all of the 
original cases continue in every round of interviews. For example, by 1999, of 16,695 
children in BCS1970, 2,608 were untraceable, 246 confirmed as emigrated, 109 had 
died, and 338 refused to take further part (Bynner et al. 2000, p.31). This left 13,394 
cases, and this number will decline with every data sweep. The dropout in NCDS1958 
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is similar. Unfortunately, the cases dropping out at each ‘sweep’ are not random. 
Presumably, the sickliest children are more likely to have died, and so on. This 
selective drop-out introduces a substantial bias for any subsequent analysis, and 
because it is not random it cannot be compensated for through statistical adjustment. 
The potential for bias can only be highlighted, and then taken into account by analysts 
and their users when judging the safety of the results. The figures are also, 
necessarily, dated, and so any claims about social mobility based on them are not 
really about Britain as it is now but as it was in previous decades. This is something 
that David Cameron, the leader of the UK opposition at time of writing, apparently 
misunderstood when also citing this research for Channel 4 news 
(http://www.channel4.com/news/special-reports/special-reports-
storypage.jsp?id=4304&parasStartAt=1). 
 
Blanden et al. (2005) used evidence from both of these cohort studies to make their 
influential claim that social mobility was decreasing over time in Britain. They 
examined the adjusted correlations between the income of the children and their 
parents in each cohort. Thus, strictly speaking, they did not consider social mobility. 
Their results apply to income mobility – the extent to which the income of the child 
depends on the income of the parent. This is an important consideration, but not the 
‘social mobility’ that the users of this research talk about (see above). A child who 
became a university lecturer, born to a father who worked as a fireman and earned as 
much in real terms as a lecturer, might be an example of social mobility based on 
education. But this would not show up as income mobility. I wonder whether Gordon 
Brown and others who cite this research are aware of this limitation?  
 
According to Blanden et al. (2005) there is a stronger, partial, correlation between the 
incomes of parents and children for BCS1970 (+0.28) than for NCDS1958 (+0.17). 
This is the basis for their claim about declining social (income) mobility. However, 
two snapshots involving two unrelated groups of children, selected for participation 
using different techniques by different researchers, are not really the ideal basis for a 
claim about a trend over time. All we can really say is that the income relationship for 
the children remaining in the 1970 cohort is stronger than for the children remaining 
in the 1958 one. Is the adjusted difference between 0.28 and 0.17 large enough for us 
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to make this claim given that over 3,000 cases would be missing from each analysis 
through dropout? 
 
Neither of the figures 0.28 or 0.17 is large. We need to square them to estimate the 
variance in income common to both the parent and child. So, for the 1970 cohort less 
than 8% (or 28% of 28%) of the variation in income of the children is attributable to 
the parents, and for the 1958 cohort, less than 3% of the variance is attributable to the 
parents. Or, expressed the other way around, for the 1958 cohort 97% of the variance 
in children’s earnings is unrelated to their parents’ earnings, and for the 1970 cohort 
92% of the variance is unrelated. Given the inevitable sampling variation in the initial 
cohorts, the dropout, the differences introduced by having panels of researchers 
conducting the interviews, and the errors in recalling, measuring and transcribing the 
figures for income, we may be forgiven for not wishing to base policy on such a small 
difference. In fact, perhaps the strongest conclusion and the most remarkable 
observation (not made by the researchers themselves) is how little variation in income 
is retained across generations of the same family (also see below).  
 
For those readers who still consider the difference between 0.28 and 0.17 to be large 
enough for successive Secretaries of Education in England to base policy on please 
consider this next concern. Blanden et al. (2005) did not actually use all of the 
remaining 13,000+ cases in each cohort for their analyses. Although not made explicit 
in their summary report, they only considered the incomes for the male children in 
each family. Thus, their claim should not be about a general decline in social 
mobility, but a snapshot difference between two cohorts in terms of the income 
mobility of parents and their sons. Of course, some families did not have sons. These 
cases are necessarily omitted by Blanden et al. (2005). We might expect, therefore, 
that each analysis involved at least 6,000+ cases – representing just under half of 
those 13,000+ cases still involved in each cohort. In fact, Blanden et al. (2005) used 
only around 2,000 cases from each cohort. Why? What happened to the other 4,000+ 
cases? For the most part, the next set of omitted cases represents those for whom 
relevant data was missing. For Blanden et al. (2005) the missing data includes any 
parents or any sons who had no earned income, even those on benefits. Thus, anyone 
economically inactive, unemployed, ill, in prison, or who would not reveal their 
income for any reason was excluded – rather than using their unearned income or 
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setting their income to zero. Thus, the claim should not be about a general decline in 
social mobility, but a snapshot difference between two cohorts in terms of the income 
mobility of parents and sons, both of whom were in declared paid employment. For 
Blanden et al. (2005) a son with a considerable income himself but born to a long-
term unemployed father does not represent any kind of social mobility. I wonder 
whether Gordon Brown and others realise that this is what the analysis entails? 
 
Blanden et al. (2005) actually used only 2,163 or 13% of the NCDS1958 cases, and 
1,976 or 12% of the BCS1970 cases. The reason why is not explained in their paper. 
No adjustment is made for this 87% to 88% attrition rate in their analysis, and 
nowhere in their findings do they caution readers about this limitation of their 
analysis. A different analyst, quite properly making different assumptions about 
male/female or types and levels of income, could come to a completely different 
conclusion with a different 12% subset of cases. In fact, Hobcraft (2001) presents the 
results from eight different combinations of the income measure of parents and the 
sex of each cohort member. The intergenerational income elasticities range from 
0.023 to 0.532 using the same dataset – the NCDS1958. What Hobcraft illustrates (in 
his Table 6) is how extraordinarily sensitive the results are to the prior analytical 
assumptions, and this leads him to agree with Breen and Goldthorpe (2001), but for 
somewhat different reasons, that it is difficult to find any evidence of a change over 
time in social mobility using the 1958 and 1970 cohorts. Blanden et al. (2002) agree 
that any results are sensitive to the precise parental income measure used (p.9). Thus, 
even minor variations in the analytical assumptions made by Blanden et al (2005) for 
the different datasets NCDS1958 and BCS1970 could easily explain a range of results 
from 0.17 to 0.28 which is much less than the range shown by Hobcraft (2001) for the 
same dataset. 
 
It is interesting to observe in Blanden et al. (2002) that their estimate of 
intergenerational elasticity for BCS1970 is 0.273. They describe this figure as the 
result for time averaged parental income – averaged when the cohort member is aged 
10 and again aged 16 (see their Table 19). For NCDS1958 they do not time average 
the result. If they had used the same approach of not time averaging the BCS figures, 
then their result for either aged 10 or aged 16 would have been the lower figure of 
0.210. This would have been much closer to the figure they do quote for NCDS and 
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which they use to claim a drop in social mobility over time. As a further example of 
the differences in analytical treatment of the different cohorts, Blanden et al. (2002) 
explain that, while it would be preferable to have the same income measures for both 
cohorts in order to make claims about changes over time, this is not possible. They 
say ‘The NCDS parental income data comes from separate measures of father’s 
earnings, mother’s earnings and other income… However, the BCS only has data on 
parents’ combined income’ (p.7). In Blanden et al. (2005), though, this problem is not 
discussed. We, therefore, need to ask whether their conclusion is safe. Is the size of 
the difference between the two cohorts large enough to overcome any reservations 
about bias caused by the non-random whittling away of cases and the differences 
between the income measures necessarily used in the two calculations?  
 
The authors quote statistical significance as though this can help answer the question. 
However, the probabilities of statistics are calculated on the basis of a random 
selection, and so are not appropriate here when 2,000 cases in each cohort have been 
systematically selected from 16,000 (Gorard 2006a). Quoting standard errors is also 
inappropriate, since this not a random sample, and quoting standard errors to three 
decimal places (as the authors do) given that most of the original cohorts are not used 
in the analysis is rhetorically misleading, by suggesting that the results are accurate to 
the nearest five parts in ten thousand. The proportion of unexplained missing cases far 
outweighs the apparent difference between the two cohorts. Given that both cohort 
studies sampled differently in the first place, asked different questions in different 
orders, and had the usual levels of measurement error, it would be unwise to base 
policy on there being a genuine underlying difference. Therefore, the purported 
explanations of the difference, such as the dangers of closing grammar schools or 
increasing access to HE, are not needed. 
 
 
Doubts about international comparators 
 
So, how robust is the second claim, that social mobility is worse than in comparable 
countries? Using the same kind of data as above, Blanden et al. (2005) claimed that 
inter-generational income mobility was much less in Britain than in six other 
comparator states. ‘International comparisons indicate that intergenerational mobility 
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in Britain is of the same order of magnitude as in the US, but that these countries are 
substantially less mobile than Canada and the Nordic countries’ (p.2). They calculate 
that the income correlation over generations is 0.27 for Britain, 0.17 for West 
Germany, 0.15 for Finland, and 0.14 for Canada, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. On 
the face of it, this is fairly damning for Britain. They present these figures in Table 2 
(p.6) of their paper, which is reproduced here as Table 1. All of the caveats about 
missing data and dropout discussed so far still apply to these figures of course, and 
should have the same effect of making readers wary of rushing to easy conclusions 
based on apparent differences between the scores for each country. 
 
Table 1 - Internationally comparable estimates of intergenerational mobility 
Country Sons born Sons earning 
measure 
Measure of 
parental status 
Partial 
correlation 
Britain 1970 Age 30 Average 
parental 
1980+1986 
.271 
US 1954-1970 Age 30 Average 
parental when 
son aged 10 
and 16 
.289 
West Germany 1960-1973 2000 Average 
parental 
1984+1988 
.171 
Canada 1967-1970 1998 Parental when 
son aged 16 
.143 
Norway 1958 Average 
1992+1999 
Father 1974 .139 
Denmark 1958-1960 Average 
1998+2000 
Father 1980 .143 
Sweden 1962 Average 
1996+1999 
Father 1975 .143 
Finland 1958-1960 Average 
1995+2000 
Father 1975 .147 
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 In some countries, the income used by Blanden et al. (2005) for the parents is the 
father’s income (as in the discussion of changes in mobility over time, see above). But 
for other countries, the average of the income for both mother and father is used 
where this is available. This reduces the comparability between countries, and it is 
notable that the inter-generational correlation (final column) seems to be lower on 
average in countries using father’s income (Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland) 
than countries using average parental income (Britain, US, and West Germany). There 
are also large differences in the ages when the incomes of parents and children were 
measured in each country. This, again, reduces comparability between the figures. 
The (higher) correlation for Britain is for sons’ income when aged 30, either 14 or 20 
years after the parents’ income was measured. In Norway, the sons were measured at 
age 34 or 41, and so were an average of eight years older than their British 
counterparts, after a gap of 18 to 25 years since the parents’ measurement (five years 
longer than their British counterparts). In Denmark the gap was 18 to 20 years for 
sons aged 38 to 42 at the time. In Sweden the gap was 21 to 24 years for sons aged 34 
to 37, and for Finland the gap between generations was 20 to 25 years for sons aged 
35 to 42. These differences in age alone would destroy the claim to differential 
mobility if, as is possible, the incomes of parents and sons tend to differ more the 
further apart the readings are taken. The differences in Table 1 might be explained as 
follows: in general, the greater the gap in years between generation measurements and 
the older the son, the lower the correlation is. They might have nothing to do with the 
societies in which these figures were collected.  
 
There are other anomalies in Table 1, such as why the figure for Britain is 0.27 not 
0.28 as it was when drawing a comparison over time (see above). But perhaps the 
most important one relates to the year of birth of the children. Why did Blanden et al. 
(2005) use figures from a 1970 cohort in Britain to compare with a 1958 cohort from 
Norway when they had a 1958 cohort from Britain as well? Their paper contains no 
account of why this unlikely comparison is preferred. I asked the authors this 
question, and their answer was that they needed to use the 1970 figures in order to 
calculate the average parental income, because they needed this for a fair comparison. 
This was not possible from the 1958 data. But, the figures they present for Norway 
are for father’s income for 1958, which they had also for Britain and which would 
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make a much fairer comparison. So this cannot be the reason. Perhaps the answer to 
my question lies in thinking through what would have happened if Blanden et al. 
(2005) had used the 1958 figures from their comparison over time. A correlation of 
+0.17, between the income of those fathers and sons with an earned income, would 
place Britain with income mobility better than that of West Germany, and much 
closer to Finland and all of the other Scandinavian countries than to the USA. 
 
The ‘sleight-of-hand’ involved in using the higher 1970 British figures in comparison 
with the 1958 figures for Norway, when coupled with the concerns over the attrition 
rate in each cohort, as already discussed, should create considerable doubt over the 
claims to credibility for this study. This is especially so because the authors do not 
discuss the problem at all in their paper. The paper contains an internal contradiction 
and so the conclusion must be false, simply in terms of logic. If it makes no difference 
to these analysts whether we use the 1958 or 1970 British figures for the international 
comparison, then we cannot also claim a noticeable change from 1958 to 1970. If, on 
the other hand, they claim that the situation is worse in 1970 than 1958 then we 
cannot use the 1970 figures to make a fair comparison with the 1958 figures from 
Norway. It is as simple as that. 
 
In a paper subsequent to my putting these points to the authors, Blanden et al. (2006) 
still claim to have found a drop in income mobility 1958 to 1970, but they no longer 
use their own analysis to claim that mobility in Britain is low compared with 
international comparators. In effect, their conclusions remain the same but they have 
now removed the data in Table 1 from the view of their readers. This means that 
readers can no longer see the internal contradiction in their position, or the manifold 
differences between the datasets for different countries. Instead of relying on their 
own analysis, the authors make the same point about the poor mobility in Britain by 
referencing the work of Jantti et al. (2006).  Blanden et al. (2006, p.2) say that ‘the 
level of mobility in the UK is low by international standards (Jantii [sic] et al. 2006)’. 
I was therefore curious to see the analysis by Jantti et al. (2006), and not unduly 
surprised to discover that this new research came to conclusions very similar to my 
own, and actually contradictory to those of Blanden et al. (2006). Jantti et al. (2006) 
quite properly used the 1958 figures for Britain as the best comparator, and found, as I 
had predicted, that the partial correlations for the UK are much closer to Finland, 
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Sweden and Norway than to the US. They conclude - ‘The United Kingdom bears a 
closer resemblance to the Nordic countries than to the United States’ (p.5), and this 
finding is even reflected in the title of their paper – ‘American exceptionalism in a 
new light: a comparison of intergenerational earnings mobility in the Nordic 
countries, the United Kingdom and the United States’. Both papers are out there for 
everyone to read and confirm that I am correct here (and I have retained copies of all 
materials in case they should disappear for any reason). I have no idea why Blanden et 
al. (2006) claimed instead that the Jantti paper showed mobility in Britain to be low 
by international standards, because they no longer reply to my academic queries on 
this matter. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
If the foregoing critique is accepted (even in part) it seems that the supposed 
explanations for poor and declining social mobility in Britain are not needed. 
However, it is intriguing to note that even in their own terms the explanations 
suggested do not really fit the timings involved. The 1958 cohort would have sat the 
11+ examination for entry to grammar schools around 1970 by which time Anthony 
Crosland’s move towards comprehensivisation was under way, even before the formal 
abolition of the tri-partite system in 1976. Circular 10/65 from the Department of 
Education and Science in 1965 had already required all LEAs to prepare for 
reorganisation of their local schools along comprehensive lines. More importantly, the 
minority of the 1958 cohort who attended university would mostly have done so at the 
traditional age around 1977. At that time, the age participation rate for social classes I, 
II and IIIN was just over 30%, and the age participation rate for social classes IIIM, 
IV and V was around 6% (Gorard et al. 2007). The 1970 cohort, on the other hand, 
would have attended university, if they did, around 1989. At this stage, the age 
participation rate for social classes I, II and IIIN was still only about 36%, and for 
social classes IIIM, IV and V it was about 9%. These changes over time are too small, 
and proportionately too much in favour of the less privileged classes, to show up as a 
subsequent reduction in income mobility. It was in the early to mid-1990s that the 
number of university places expanded dramatically with the overall participation of 
both groups combined reaching more than 40%. This was mostly too late for the 1970 
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cohort, and anyway the growth in HE participation continued to be greater for the less 
privileged class groups anyway. 
 
Although this is not the point made by the authors, one of the most notable features of 
the transmission matrices produced by Blanden et al. (2005) from both NCDS1958 
and BCS1970 is actually the high level of social mobility in the UK for both cohorts. 
For example, in both cohorts around 17% of those born to the poorest 25% of families 
end up in the richest quadrant, and vice versa. If there were no financial inheritance, 
no inheritance of talent, no nepotism, and perfect social mobility then the maximum 
this figure could be is 25%. The difference from the ideal of perfect mobility in these 
tables containing 2,000 cases is represented by only about 25 cases in each of the 
‘wrong’ extreme cells. Taken at face value, a key policy message could be that Britain 
has a quite staggering level of social mobility. If we truly value this then we should be 
wary of doing anything on the basis of poor evidence that might endanger it. 
 
Unfortunately, the unfounded claims by Blanden et al. (2005) that social mobility in 
Britain is poor and worsening over time have passed into being as social facts. Bad 
news such as this often seems more exciting for the media and more palatable for 
commentators and politicians than the truth that change over time is usually less 
dramatic, less influenced by policy, and more beneficial, than they want to believe 
(Gorard 2006b). The case study discussed in detail in this paper, chosen because of its 
profile, is not unique. It illustrates graphically the point that quality and impact are not 
always related and that, of the two, research quality is more important than impact. 
High quality research with no impact remains secure as knowledge and might be used 
in the future. Poor quality research is useless because it leads to insecure knowledge. 
Poor quality research with high visibility or impact is worse than useless. It could 
endanger the very thing it was intended to improve.  
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